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Chapter One:

I:

Introduction

Introduction
Morocco is a state of many nations. The throngs of people on the streets

of Tangier, Rabat, Essouaria, and Zagora represent an immense variety of
different backgrounds. Cultural diversity and political correctness are
concepts that have not entered the intellectual discourse of Morocco let alone
become a concern of the rural farmer. Yet Moroccans hold senses of identity
connected to their historical and ethnic backgrounds. Historically, many of the
Moroccan peoples were organized tribally and drew much of their regional
identity from these groupings. Now, the significance of tribes has reduced to
such an extent that larger groupings have become more important; however,
the heritage of this background remains strong. Amazight ethnicity depends
on the continuity of tribal forms.
While other ethnic identities, such as Jewish, Bedouin, and subSaharan African, represent significant portions of the Moroccan population,
this study focuses on the Amazights in the Morocco of today; that Morocco is a
developing country struggling to catch up to the Western World that has so
strongly influenced it. The Amazight is a group of people of unclear
geographic, historical, and ethnic origin; "a composite people; ... the affinity
among the various people seems to be solely linguistic" (Nelson 1985:4).
Although their tradition traces their origins to two unrelated families;
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Amazights have now grown to account for an unknown, but large, percentage
of the population, anywhere from 20 to 80 percent (e.g. Hoffman 1967: 19,
Wolfert 1973: 13). The discrepancies in the figures stem from the Moroccan
census that does not include Amazight/Berber as a choice for either ethnicity
or primary language. This segment of the Moroccan population is redefining
itself in the context of a state dominated by French and Arab influences; the
Amazight are taking new pride in their language and heritage and seeking to
break into government in a more active way in an effort to define themselves
as a cultural driving force.
This study will demonstrate that the Amazight are a distinct ethnic
group in Morocco, despite the common interpretation in scholarly and
everyday discourse that they are merely groups of people speaking one of the
Amazight language and not representing a distinct cultural entity. The study
will go on to examine the ramifications of this ethnic identity and the heritage
of the historical and tribal roots of the Amazight in light of nationalism, state
building, ethnicity, and cultural marginalization.
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II:

Fieldwork and Methodology
The core research for this study was done over a three week period from

April 20 to May 11, 1996 as part of the School for International Training
College Semester Abroad in Morocco, Spring 1996. Dr. Susan Schaefer Davis
and Dr. Abdelhay Moudden served as my advisers. I interviewed
approximately thirty people representing both Arab and Amazight identities, a
wide variety of adult ages, and both men and women. Of course, some were
much more valuable as sources of information and/or insight that others
While I had a set of questions in mind, a formal interview with a list of
question, paper, pen, and a cassette recorder proved to be an ineffective
strategy. Most of my information comes from casual conversations that I
framed around my questions. These were two way conversations with people
just as eager to understand me and my background as I was to understand
them and theirs.
Furthermore (and most frustrating), the data are limited by time and
access issues growing out of language limitations and aspects of being a
woman interacting with Moroccan cultures. The majority of my informants
are young males. This is because I had to access people through the public
sphere, a male dominated environment in Morocco. This category of the
population is the most willing and accessible even within the public sphere as
(given the unemployment problem in Morocco) they had the time to talk to me.

In most cases, to meet women I had to be invited into the homes of the men
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whom I had met in cafes, etc. This required a degree of trust in these men
that I did not always have (not to mention the implication about my character
that such an action would have meant to other Moroccans).
Additionally, particularly in Setti Fadma, the language barrier was an
issue. This was an

issu~most problematic with children and women. The

vast majority of the conversations upon which this study is based took place in
French with some in English. Arabic was used mostly as a rapport builder.
As my topic focused on Amazight peoples, many of my informants spoke an
Amazight language in daily life. Man:y females, who are educated in
significantly smaller numbers than males, spoke only one of the three
Amazight languages. Others spoke Amazight and Derija, the Moroccan dialect
of Arabic that differs from Fousha, the Modern Standard Arabic (so much that
they are not really mutually intelligible). Morocco: A Country Study tells us
that only one percent of Riffian Amazight women speak another language in
addition to Riffian Amazight; the statistic is significantly higher in other areas
(fifty-eight percent in the Middle Atlas) (Nelson 1985: 114).
I spent research time in five different communities. A total of eight
days were spent in the urban areas of Casablanca, Rabat, and Marrakech, a
historically Amazight city. I was in Khemisset, a provincial capital perhaps 75
km outside Rabat, for six days. This town is noted for its weekly carpet souk
(market). It is close to the Middle Atlas mountains, therefore it is populated
by both Arabs and Am'azight, who are probably the majority of the population.

5

The rest of my time was spent in Setti Fadma, a small almost entirely
Amazight village approximately 65 km south of Marrakech in the High Atlas
Mountains. This town is the site of a saint's tomb dedicated to the daughter of
Mohammed the Prophet, Fatima. The tomb is the site of a moussem (religious
festival in honor of a saint) held each August cited as one of the three most
important in Morocco (Rough Guide 1995: 298). The economic activities of the
town include goat, sheep, and cow pastoralism. In addition, there is limited
cherry, apple, and other terrace horticulture. A few families engage in the
potentially lucrative; but risky, walnut harvesting. The town is becoming
increasingly dependent on tourism to the nearby cascades both by Moroccans
and foreigners. This made it significantly easier for me to interview in this
town than other small villages that I had visited . .
People and their opinions that I cite in this paper are often only
representative examples. Wherever possible, I have let an interviewee speak
(through my translation) rather than choosing their words for them. Names of
cited informants appear with some biographical information as an appendix.
An important word choice I have made is to refer to this segment of

Moroccan society as "Amazight", a word coming from their languages meaning
"free man", rather than Berber. The second term is the one most commonly
found in the literature, however, it is related to "barbarian". For obvious
reasons, the Amazight people, particularly those living in southern Morocco,
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have strong objections to its connotations and demand the use of "Amazight"
instead.
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Chapter Two:

I:

Theoretical Foundations

Ethnicity
In order to fully grasp the placement of the Amazight within Moroccan

society and to connect this study ~}a'ore general cultural processes, it is
necessary to look at the theories of ethnicity circulating today. Fredrick
Barth's Ethnic Groups and Boundaries is one of the most influential works in
this area However, there are many other theories of varying utility. In the
case of the Amazight, it is interesting to consider their ethnicity in light of
immigration theory. These theories allow one to define the Amazight as a
distinct ethnic group rather than a linguistic unit in all other respects like the
remainder of the Moroccan population.
Relevant to discussion of ethnicity are the distinctions between ethnic
categories, ethnic identities, and ethnic groups. These terms may be seen as
levels of a hierarchy in that order. Only when a community of individuals
reach the level of "group" do they become a culturally and socially significant
category.! An ethnic category exists when characteristics may define an
individual as a member (or not as a member) of the category. As a category is
not a culturally and socially salient method of categorization, this is a low
level distinction. Ethnic identity comes with self-subscription to a category.

Cultural significant is taken to mean that cultural forms are effected by this trait. Socially
significant indicates that the organization and institutions of a society are in some way dependent
on the described trait.

1
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This level is culturally and socially significant. However, an ethnic group is
the only level in which there is a social component. To define ethnic group,
persons share an ethnic identity and use that

iden~ity

as a primary basis for

social organization (Casson 1994).
In order define ethnicity, there are four major areas of concern. The
term "ethnic group" as defined above may be applied to peoples meeting the
following criteria.
•

An ethnic group must be a biologically self perpetuating population.

•

They must share cultural values and beliefs and express this in overt
cultural forms.

•

A field of communication and interaction between the members must
be defined. This factor is often defined by a common language not
shared with other groups.

•

A group must identify with a cultural category that defines and
distinguishes them from all others (Barth 1969: 10-11).

Although much of the anthropological literature has discounted the
usefulness of making ethnic distinctions between Arabs and Amazight,
ethnicity is a salient feature in the social, cultural, and political construction
of Morocco. This is demonstrated by the etically definable ethnicity of the
Amazight. Other sections of this study will look at these traits in greater
deta~l.

However, to briefly fit the Amazight into this model, they meet the four

criteria. As they have retained systems of kinship and tribal ties, they have
maintained an at least partially biologically self-perpetuating population. It is
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important to regard ethnic groups not as completely closed systems, but rather
as a component of larger society with permeable boundaries; nevertheless, the
internal cohesion of the group is maintained. The Amazight certainly share
cultural beliefs and values, as demonstrated by their own statements and
outside observation. Moreover, the Amazight have their distinct languages.
Finally, the Amazight do identify themselves and are identified by others as
belonging to a distinctive category.
At this point, it also important to stress that there is no implication of
equality in "ethnic group" status. Indeed, ethnicity has often been the basis
for the maintenance of an intrinsically unequal system, as in the case of
slavery or policies regarding Native Americans in the United States.
Paul Starr has provided an etic "checklist" of ethnicity that is applicable
to the case of the Amazight and many others. It depends on what he calls
"features" (physically definable aspects) and "dimensions". However, Starr is
not implying that appearance plays a large role in ethnicity. The items to look
for include: language; vocabulary; dress (including colors and styles of dress
shared with other ethnicities); tattoos, body scarring, and other methods of self
marking; residence patterns, particularly those that associate groups with
difference communities, and individual's names (Casson 1994). All these items
are present to varying degrees among the Amazight peoples.
Barth has provided a key element to the study of ethnicity by expanding
concerns in his refocusing onto the cultural. He moves away from the four
criteria listed above. This does not mean that he invalidates them; rather he
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sees them as results and not markers of ethnicity. His ethnic groups are
defined simply as cultural bearing units (Barth 1969: 11). His most significant
contribution is the notion that people in the same cultural category can engage
in very different activities in very different environments; for example, the
Amazight rural pastoral nomad and the Amazight urban shopkeeper are both
Amazight. This is due to the shared "basic value orientation" that, along with
the other elements of their culture, defines a group of people as an ethnic

.

group (Barth 1969: 11-12). To Barth self-identification becomes paramount.
In this case study, the self-identification criteria is certainly meet.
This leads into the next major concern of his work; boundaries and their
maintenance. While some ethnic groups have little or no contact with others,
most have to establish a system to maintain their ethnicity while engaging in
a society with other ethnic groups. The ethnic groups modifies some modes of
interaction, cultural behavior, etc. therefore "insulating parts of the culture
from confrontation and modification" (Barth 1969: 16). Flow across the
boundaries, as in the extensive intermarriage of the Amazight with Arabs,
may increase the stability of the system by keeping the population at a level
that can be maintained by the cultural norms (Barth 1969: 23).
Barth also makes the important point that ethnicity may be situational.
People define their ethnicity more or less specifically in different
circumstances. An interesting example of this is terminology used to describe
Americans of Asian and Pacific Island descent. Many will adopt the
generalized term "Asian-American" in situations of mixed ethnicity,
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particularly in the presence of non-As ian-Americans. However, many also
maintain a more specific ethnicity, such as Korean-American or JapaneseAmerican, used under circumstances where the country of origin is more
important (Espiritu 1992: 15). Additionally, an ethnic identity may become
more or less important as circumstances change.
To further explore changes in expression of ethnicity, a theory from
immigration and ethnicity may be invoked. In this model, the first generation
retains its ethnic identity, the second generation rejects it, and the third
generation reclaims the ethnic identity of the first generation (Hurh 1980: 46).
This model may be applied in the case study at hand for specific political
reasons. As Morocco was a colonized nation until 1956, it is essentially a new
nation. The Amazight are in many respects in a situation similar to
immigrant groups as they have lived under the domination of another group
for this

entire~The

first generation may be seen as the Amazight under the

late French Protectorate and early independence, who maintained their
ethnicity through government policy and an their struggle for independence.
The second generation discarded their ethnic identity in an attempt to belong
to a new category -- Moroccan. Unfortunately, for a variety of reasons to be
discussed, the Amazight ended up in a subordinated position. This, as in the
case of immigrants, resulted from the retention of an ethnic category by the
dominant ethnic group. The generation that is now in their late teens to late
twenties belongs to the third generation of post colonial Amazight. Following
the pattern observed in Asian and other immigrants to the United States, this
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generation is reclaiming the ethnicity of the first generation. Also reflecting
the immigrants on whom the theory is based, this generation exists in
different social and political circumstances that prevent a complete reversion.
Instead, the third generation negotiates a new ethnicity based on the current
situation and on their heritage. In the immigrant case, this results in
composite identities, like Korean-American (Hurh 1980: 60). For the
Amazight, and other groups for whom this model may work, the new identity
may not have a new label but a reformulation of the original ethnicity.
Important models can also be gleamed from several other theories of
ethnicity. Abdo 1. Baaklini proposes several characteristics of ethnic conflict
that are useful for this study. His theory is based on Lebanese ethnic conflict
and is concerned with political forces. It views ethnic groups as political actors
who change strategies to gain the greatest possible share of power (Baaklini
1982: 50). This approach also broadens the scope of consideration of ethnicity.
Rather than limiting conflict to- those
between ethnic groups, it recognizes that
,.....,...-.
.

conflict within an ethnicity is key in its development and maintenance (or lack
thereof) (Baaklini 1982: 51). Moreover, it rejects inevitability based on the
usual divisions of ethnicity, race, class, etc. Instead, ethnic conflict in
pluralistic societies is based in three dynamics. First, inter-ethnic and intraethnic conflict are instrumental in the society at large. Second, secular and
nationalistic forces appealing across ethnic boundaries in turn exacerbate and
accentuate ethnic conflict. This is because they do not adhere to the usual
societal mechanisms. Eventually trans-ethnic groups are seen as usurping

n

13

power. Finally, integrative institutions, such as the military, a single strong
leader, or political systems that do not recognize ethnic difference, will not
succeed in controlling conflict as well as representative institutions may.
Although Morocco is not experiencing ethnic conflict to the same magnitude as
Lebanon and many other contemporary states, these models of conflict are
applicable.
A symposium at the 1979 American Psychological Association
Convention proposed a graduate curriculum for "Ethnic Psychology". This
sequence of classes would address six areas of concern for those practicing
psychology in a world diversified by race, culture, and ethnicity. The six areas
are cognitive process, perceptual processes, mental health, attitudes and
personality, value, and group process (Ramirez and Ossorio 1982: 285). For
these purposes, three of the areas are important. "Values" deals with
"assimilation, acculturation, family, and cultural values." "Perceptual
processes" are "self-perception, self-esteem, self-concept, and ethnic identity."
"Group processes" refers to "intergroup conflict, cooperation, and separatism,
group identity, ethnic group relations, [and] intra-.group conflict" (Ramirez
and Ossorio 1982: 285). These categories point to the issues that should be
kept in mind when attempting to grapple with ethnicity. In addition, the
areas of concern also point to the two dimensions of "groupness". A group has
both conceptual and organizational dimensions. The two may be difficult to
separate and may also be at odds (Espiritu 1992: 15). However, it is important
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to keep in mind that these two dimension must remain for a group to maintain
cohesion. Additionally, any group depends on individuals to maintain it.
Ethnicity is a broad and difficult concept to systematize into a concise
set of points. However, the above theories do well at sign posting things to
look for as one embarks on a study of ethnicity (in this case the Amazight).
The Amazight do in fact have the sufficient cultural distinctiveness to be
considered a group separate from the Arabs. Additionally, they see themselves
as forming a distinct group. Attention must be paid to the process of selfidentification and outside identification. At this time, the Amazight are
engaged in a low level ethnic conflict. This stresses the importance of group
cohesion and group processes. One must also look to the political system to
find the source and solution to the need for the Amazight to state their ethnic
identity in concrete terms in the Post Colonial Moroccan state.
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II:

Political Symbolism
Just as tools were needed to understand the ethnic issues involved, one

must also look briefly at political symbolism. By looking to the theory of
political symbols, it becomes clear how and why certain events and behaviors
take on significance.
To pick a prominent theorist in the area once more, Abner Cohen
provides powerful tools for dealing with this topic. Fundamentally, his theory
states that human beings and the societies that they create have two
dimensions. In the case of people, these dimensions are political and
symbolist. "Normative culture" will also express two dimensions, political and
psychological (Cohen 1979: 99). Symbolism unites the dimensions of each
layer as well as the humans and their societies. As might be expected, Cohen
suggests that symbolism has two dimensions, existential and political. Both
these dimensions may be manipulated (Cohen 1979: 98).

In order to discuss political symbols, "politicar' must be defined.
Throughout this study, Cohen's definition will be adopted. Politics is the
"distribution, maintenance, exercise of, and struggle for power within "a social
units;" all relationships and power dynamics contribute to this system (Cohen
1979: 88). To paraphrase Cohen, individuals, collectively or not, will
continually exert pressure on the state just as the state will continually exert
pressure on them (Cohen 1979: 88). Power is also the common denominator of
political and economic concerns; this power is articulated in kinship, ritual,
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and other components of culture (Cohen 1979: 88, 110). Therefore, power is
always at the core of the discussion of this study, whether or not this is
articulated overtly.
Symbols organize all culture, to a certain degree. Political relationships
are no exception. The most politically significant symbols are overtly nonpolitical; the less obviously political a symbol is the more efficacious it is
politically. As symbols are by definition ambiguous, they depend upon the
interpretation of the members of a society (Cohen 1979: 87). For example, the
religious festival lid Kahbir (literally, the big feast) calls for the slaughter of a
sheep by every Muslim family. The king of Morocco is the religious leader; his
,/

Q...,-'

/" religious edit is almost as good as the word of the Qur'an. Unique to Morocco,
King Hassan II has more than once (including 1996) declared that he will
slaughter the only sheep in the place of all members of his state. This decision
is ostensibly because of the high price of sheep, partially due to a small supply
of Moroccan sheep. This would create undue economic hardship for the entire
country as sheep would have to be imported, raising the price. The king
slaughtered his sheep publicly, broadcasting the event on television. While
this was a religiously symbolic act, motivated by economic pressures, it quickly
became a political symbol. While many families were happy to be relieved of
the burden of time, expense, and having to eat all that sheep meat (which
takes a very long time), others resisted. As with my host family, they chose to
obey the word of the king, but not his intention. Rather than slaughtering a
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sheep, they bought pieces of sheep representative of all parts. They did watch
the sacrifice on television, and then prepared their feast. While this was
somewhat resistant to the power of the king, defiance was expressed strongly
in rural areas. As most families do not have a television, so could not
participate in the collective sacrifice, and many are sheep farmers facing

~.

potential ruin by the edf( they came to regard the king's action as directed
against them.

Many families chose to have a larger than normal lid Kahbir.

Additionally, Morocco has a festival to celebrate the king's birthday. Although
celebrations are typically smaller in rural areas, the event went by virtually
unnoticed in these areas in 1996. However, these events were not overtly
conceptualized as political resistance. Rather, they saw resistance-was as a
function of the supply of sheep. The lack of celebration due to the flooding of /
/

the previous months and the economic situation caused by the crash of the

- ( \
, A;' ("

sheep market. As the rural population had abundant sheep, they saw no
reason to cancel lid Kahbir. While these factors may have played a role, all
the events took on political symbolism centering on the power of the king. It
will become more significant later in this study that responses fall on urban
and rural divides.
Political symbols, as covert mechanisms, are omnipresent 2!! social
organization. It is important to recognize that these symbols order experience
and structure, but do not define it. Symbols may either uphold or change the
existing systems. Power and symbolism pervade all levels of social and
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cultural life (Cohen 1979: 110). However, they are the instruments of change .

..-t-.
Although he uses a differenC9-vocabulary, Bruce Lincoln writes the following:
To hold that thought is socially determined does not mean that all
thought reflects, encodes, re-presents, or helped replicate the established
structures of society, for society is far broader and more complex than its
official structures and institutions alone. Rather, such a formulation
rightly implies that all the tensions, contradictions, superficial stability,
and potential fluidity of any given society as a whole are present within
the full range of thought and discourse that circulates at any given
moment. Change comes not when groups or individuals use
"knowledge" to challenge ideological mystification, but rather when they
employ thought and discourse, including even such modes as myth and
ritual, as effective instruments of struggle. (Lincoln 1989: 7)

Thus, power and politics mediated by symbols become a primary concern,
because they can both change and sustain a system. Power and the struggle to
attain it, most often achieved at times of flux, will remain a key issue.
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Chapter Three:

I:

History, Organization, and Politics

Historical Background
It is important to place the Amazight in their historical perspective for

it is here that the antecedents for characteristics of the contemporary
Amazight may be found. To briefly summarize the major cycles of Moroccan
history, tribes with limited spheres of influence had carved up between. As
they divided these areas among heirs, Morocco became increasingly
fragmented. In the late seventh and early eighth century, Arabs successfully
brought Islam to Morocco through military conquest and settled as a ruling
urban elite. The Amazight quickly adopted Islam in large numbers, unifying
Morocco at least on one subject. Moulay Idriss, an Arab who had settled with
an Amazight tribe established the first Islamic dynasty. This dynasty saw the
rise of Fez, with its inhabitants declaring themselves to be Arabs by virtue of
their physical location and political allegiance. It is probable that most of
these Fassis were predominately Amazight (particularly on the maternal side).
The glory of this dynasty was short-lived as a fast turnover of Amazight tribes
supplanted the Idrissis and then each other. The Almovids, the next
significant dynasty, brought "nominal political unity to all present day
Morocco" and actively participated in the Abbasid Caliphate. In time, they too
fell, this time to the Almohads, another Amazight dynasty, who by 1140
occupied most of Morocco. The third significant Amazight dynasty was the

~-
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Merinid, who took the Almohadi capital of Marrakech in 1271. They were the
last of the Amazight dynasties, simply fading away into a period of power
struggles from 1415 until the early 17th century rise to power of the illouite
dynasty that holds the throne to this day. The Alouite used a plea of direct
descent from the prophet, Mohammed, and therefore a claim of Arab identity
to gain popular support (Nelson 1985). While this brief summary serves only to
fit the right names and time periods together, it demonstrates that the
Amazight were a powerful political force through much of Morocco history.
International influence has always been strong in Morocco. This
influence is by virtue of the geographical position of Morocco. Situated at the
5

Atlantic entrance to the Mediterranean Sea, with coast on both bodies of
water, Morocco has long been an influence on and influenced by the heavy,
multinational commerce of the Mediterranean. Moreover, their position at the
top of trade routes across the Sahara from Sub-Saharan African nations has
brought a strong cultural and economic tradition. The proximity of Spain,
merely 15 kilometers across the Strait of Gibraltar, also encouraged close
connections to Europe. However, the most influential international influence
was the 20th century period of French Protectorate, more overt than other
demonstrations of influence, forcing Sultan Mohammed V into exile. This
French occupation brought a powerful Western style presence and all its
ramifications into Morocco. Although it took many years, the French
eventually gained control of all the tribes of l\iorocco for the first time in

//
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history and established a government and urban society that reflected the
European heritage of the colons.
If "the course of Moroccan history before the protectorate was seen as

the efforts of the Arab government forces to impose themselves on Berber
dissidents," French colonialism left behind the mechanism to put the Arabs
firmly in control, and the Arabs and the Amazight found themselves in .a/ new
I

positions to fight for dominance of the Moroccan cultural and political life
(Burke qtd. in Seddon 1982: 29).
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II:

Ramifications of Segmentary Lineage and Tribal

Heritage
The early historical record o~1V1:orocco is devoted to the waxing and
waning of the relative powers of competitive tribes. These tribes were what
actually organized the people on the ground; they were responsible for cultural
structure that shaped social, political, and even economic life.

Segmentary Lineage and Tribes
Mfiliation to a tribe is generally made genealogically, often based on
segmentary lineage systems of kinship (Coon 1931: 72). The tradition of origin
and descent is usually rooted in legend; however, the legend is flexible enough
to meet the current needs of political situation of the tribe. (Seddon 1981: 86).
Segmentary lineage is usually summed up in cliched expression "I against my
brother; my bother and I against my cousin; my cousin, my brother, and I
against the world." The system is based on patrilineal descent and
occasionally tweaked so that it balances exactly. Each level of descent has an
equal and opposite counterpart from the individual household to the entire
tribe. Generally, each level had some form of leadership and corresponding
scope of power. For example, the Saharan nomads called Tuareg are
structured family, faction, clan, tribe, confederacy, nation of Tuareg, with each
level building on the previous (Briggs 1960: 126). The higher the level the
more nebulous the affiliation is from an emic perspective. The Tuareg, to
continue the example, will classify each other by tracing the family line
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starting with the parents until a mutually known or connected relative of
ancestor is discovered. They also know who is not "Tuareg", although they do
not always know what their tribe is called, nor be able to name their nation by
its common etic appellation of "Tuareg". Rank and responsibility belong to
some segment of the lineage, and not to an individual. Entire clans can
change their distribution with over arching levels or organization to ease
conflict. This leads to a kind of collective responsibility that is key to
understanding the "law and order" heritage of Morocco.
Many tribes had other organization strategies, usually in addition to
segmentary lineage. For example, the Riffian tribes had a "highly complex"
governmental system attached to their segmentary lineage system. This
system was essentially composed of three councils arranges hierarchically.
Often membership was elected. First was the village council responsible for
minor social transgression. Above that was the "council of the great"; usually
this council covered the same area as a souk and regularly met there. They
were responsible for inter-village conflict and greater social transgressions.
Finally, there was a tribal council that handled major issues with their own
tribe and inter-tribal conflict and wars that were a staple of early Morocco
(Coon 1931: 83, 142).
Thus, tribes were set up to organize all of their members; some grew in
power sufficiently to control other tribes. When there were dynasties ruling
greater Morocco, in a model constructed by Ernest Gellner, tribes fell into one
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of three categories. Those who ruled, those who paid allegiance and taxes, and
those who refused to recognize the ruling tribe (Seddon 1981: 31). While this
may be an oversimplification, it demonstrates how Morocco was a patchwork
or tribes and not a cohesive unit.
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Tribes, Power, and Politics
Tribes remain an intriguing issue in the political, "law and order" lives
of Amazights as well as maintaining their position as a defining factor in the
identity of the Amazight. Tribes essentially formed the political organization
of Morocco until the mid twentieth century; they were "the most intricate level
of social and territorial organization in Morocco" (Miller 1984: 195). They have
not disappeared completely today despite a constitutional monarchical
government that runs the state of Morocco. The sense of justice that
accompanied tribal law remains strong in the value system today. The
mechanisms continue to be invoked in informal cases and those outside the
realm of Moroccan law. More importantly, tribes are fundamental to the
identity of their members. James Miller lists three factors that define the Ait

Mizane, a neighboring tribe to the residents of Setti Fadma. The environment
and Islam provide two of the threads, but the third is the tribe, "the social
organizer of local land and life, powerful symbolic repository of past
experience, and a vehicle through which people meet the challenges of
everyday life" (Miller 1984: 6).
One of the more significant ramifications of the traditional structure of
Morocco is the informal organization and justice mechanisms that are still
invoked frequently today. Mohammed told me about a case in his tribe. There
was a man in Khemisset who was often late for appointments or missed them
altogether. Finally, a business associate became annoyed enough that he went
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to the oldest man in the tribe for advise. As there is no longer a formal power
structure within the tribe, the oldest man fills the role that could be termed
"chief'. This echoes the cultural beliefs in the superiority of the wisdom of
males and elders. The elder proposed a solution; the next day about 40 people
turned up at the offender's home shortly before lunch. Of course, he was
obligated to feed all of them or lose his honor and reputation. This is because
a gracious and generous host is one of the first ideals of Amazight personality
theory. Despite this informal power, the tribes lack real leverage.
Most of my informants knew of and took pride in their tribe as a source
of identity. Several of my informants, including Akhmed, had ridden for their
tribes in a Fantasia. "Fantasia" is the word used in Amazight and Arabic
(although clearly of French origin) to describe a traditional Amazight event
that celebrates tribal pride. Fantasias are commonly convened in the spring
and fall. They may be in honor of an important wedding or other significant
individual event; however, they are more often a large party for everyone.
Often they are timed to coincide with a religious celebration. For these
celebrations, a tribe sends its best horses and horsemen dressed in their finest
clothes and riding tack. The participants gallop down a field surrounded on all
sides by spectators. As they approach the end of the field, all the riders stop
their horses dead in their tracks then twirl and fire rifles in unison.
Elaine Combs-Schilling provides an analysis of the Fantasia as an event
that "without much subtlety ... mimics the sexual act" (Combs-Schilling 1989:
203). However, she also points to another significant element of symbolism--
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control. Just as the rider must remain in control of his mount and his
emotions if he and his team perform well or poorly (Combs-Schilling 1989:
204), the event also celebrates the control of the tribe. The Fantasia is a
condensed expression of tribal pride and cohesion. The actual contests of the
. Fantasia recall the military past of independent tribes and evoke pride in the
heritage of the tribe. As collective contests, they rely upon the unity of the
related men. Surrounding events of the Fantasia also stress the unity of tribes
as well as reinforce their relationships with between tribes. Many families
erect tents on the site, and the most powerful entertain large groups of people.
The event provides a forum for the contracting of marriages, business
contracts, and all other inter-family matters. Formerly, Fantasias were the
locus of inter-tribal and tribal decision making. Now, they are almost
symbolic calls on the tribal identity while concretely stating the social
relationships between members.
Akhmed is extremely sad that the power of his tribe has diminished
within his lifetime. He said that the tribe is just not well enough organized to
wield any real power. He felt that there was greater justice under tribal law,
but Arab law and domination of the educational system has prevented the
young Amazight from studying their own heritage in order to even know that
they are being oppressed. Instead, young tribe members look to the
government for leadership. This is despite their elders efforts to teach them to
take pride in their tribe. However, this trend is subject a reversal at this time.
I found in the young an increasingly strong interest in the tribe and the
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associations they make to independence, strength, and their identity as
Amazight.
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Political Heritage of Tribes and Amazight Ethnicity
There are political ramifications of tribal heritage and Amazight
identity. David Sedan writes, "tribal divisions, which frequently coincide with
electoral boundaries, although they have not been of general political
importance ... are of some importance in that their persistence as cultural and
ideological entities cast local politics in a distinctive and somewhat restricted
mold" (275). It is this level of politics that the Amazight I met seemed most
interested in; however many are interested in using their interrelated
Amazight ethnicity and tribal identity to bring issues to national attention.
Another slant on this is to make tribal/Amazight identity a national
issue unto itself. After independence, there have been various political parties
viewed as "Berber" by the Moroccan populace. This is partially because they
represent the economic concerns of the mostly rural farming and pastoral
Amazight and partially because they appeal to Amazight identity to garner
support (Seddon 1988: 167-183). However, the distinction between the two
concerns-is not as great as it may seem due to the strong correlation between
rural living and Amazight ethnicity. Although these parties have yet to gain
significant political power, that they exist at all indicates an interest in the
making Amazight identity one of political significance. As the younger
generations age into politics, particularly the newly urban Amazight youth, it
is likely that this movement will become stronger.
At a more subtle level, Amazight identity already plays a greater role in
Moroccan politics. Amazights have been regarded almost universally in
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Moroccan history as "dissidents", not succumbing to Roman or Arab rule, not
even to Amazight dynasties. They continued this tradition in resisting French
colonialism and participating in the struggle for independence. In recent years
there have been more Amazight movements in Morocco (Lakhsassi 1996). A
government publication refers to the organization of local politics as "heir to a
long past" in clear reference to tribal organization (The Organization ... 54).
Thus, tribal and Amazight identities continue to playa key role in the
structure and tone of Moroccan politics.
However, the extent of the Amazight influence has been limited in the
post colonial period. Other parts of this study have pointed to the relationship
between Amazight ethnicity and several factors affecting their placement in
the power structure. Given the tradition of the Amazight to remain focused on
their immediate environment, it is logical that they have not succeeded in nor
have been interested in claiming power at the nation state level. Also, their
continued participation in rural economies of farming and pastoralism have
left them out of the greater, international economic market in which urban
Morocco participates. Although the Amazight used to control the trade routes
that crossed the Sahara, these trade routes have largely been supplanted by
other modes and lines of trade. In addition, the colonial period also reduced
the Amazight's control of these sectors of their traditional economies. The
educational system and these economic concerns have marginalized the
Amazight out of the city based wealthy that control the national government.
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The corrupt national government, in a top down model, has reduced the
influence of the Amazight in the areas t h at they demographically dominate.
The limitation of the scope of influence of the Moroccan tribe also rests
in the traditional relationship between tribe and sultan. The sultan may be
seen as analogous to the modern national government, at least in terms of
attitude. Tribes traditionally felt threatened by the power of the sultan.
However, they could choose to recognize the sultan only as a religious leader,
or to not recognize even this religious authority (Miller 1984: 197-98).
Moreover, the position of sultan was always open to threat from a would-be
replacement. This fluidity made the central government less threatening
(Miller 1984: 197). It was trade that united tribes together, not a political
figurehead. As Miller says "market day has always been truce day in Morocco"
(Miller 1984: 198). This system allowed a tribe to select a level of involvement
/

in the central government, while also defining that governments role more
narrowly than the modern government. As such, the tribe after their united
struggle with the Arabs for independence found themselves in unfamiliar
political territory. Unable to negotiate terms at that time, they remained
without a strong voice.
The younger generations of the Amazight are currently attempting to
renegotiate this p,osition. As more Amazight move to the cities and circles of
higher education and power while maintaining their Amazight identity, they
are using their knowledge of the Morocco of today and their heritage to find a
role for themselves in a contemporary state that also celebrates their ethnic

v/
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identity. To separate ethnic identity from tribal identity would be virtually
impossible in the case of the Amazight. However, this does not mean that the
tribe as a discrete unit is the source of identity. Rather, the common heritage
of a tribal structure with all its ideological, organizational, and philosophical
ideas is shared by all Amazights. This is one of the ways in which a panAmazight identity, despite the linguistic, environmental, geographical, and
cultural differences between the three major groups is possible.
Tribalism, in this context, refers to the continuation of the influence of
the tribe in framing the identity of the individuals that belong to it. In the case
of post colonial Morocco, the tribe continues to contribute a social and political
framework to some extent, particularly in the rural areas. As the tribe is no

S'

longer invested with formal powers, it lends it weight to more general
Amazight identity. The population of Morocco is increasingly urbanizing (in
the last census Morocco was for the first time slightly over fifty percent urban;
many Amazight are taking their identities with them. They look to their
tribal heritage for pride and ethnicity as well as for ideology that they are
using in their efforts to renegotiate their position in the government, power
structure, and cultural heritage of modern Morocco.

~
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III: Arabization and Colonization
French colonialism was frequently offered to me as a model for
understanding the coming of the Arabs to Morocco. However, discussion of the
French Protectorate rarely had the explicit expressions of feelings of
oppression that accompanied discussion of Arabization/Islamization of
Morocco. Three factors seemed to be at work. First, people presented that
model as they felt I would understand it. Analogy was possible without the
emotion content. Indicative of a distinction between ethnic and political
domination, the Amazight did not express feelings of oppression under the
French regime or stated that the oppression was generalized to the entire
Moroccan population (rather than specific components of it). Finally, because
the French have essentially left Morocco, leaving it to redefine itself in their
wake, they are no longer a significant presence. All of these perceptions shape
attitudes towards both the arrival of Arabs in Amazight Morocco and the
French Protectorate. Other informants gave a much more peaceful,
integrationist view of the situations. Both these models and historical events
have led to a theme of Arab/urban, Amazight/rural identification.
All of my informants, including the Arabs, stressed the Amazight
origins of Morocco, directly contradicting the scholarly belief that the Arab
conquest is culturally seen as the beginning of Morocco, indicative of the
change in attitudes towards the Amazight (Entelis 1989: 25). The peaceful
camp, including Salat and Mohammed, presented an arrival of Arabs that was

34

essentially a

non~military

religious conversion. Amazight women married the

Arab men, and, due to patrilineal descent, the children were considered to be
Arab and may have learned to speak only Arabic. Their descendants were also
considered to be Arab; however, many of these individuals have maintained
closer ties to their Amazight heritage. These families lived in the blossoming
cities. Saied and Salat brought the argument full circle by declaring that the
origins of the Amazight peoples lay in ancient migration from the Arabian
peninsula. Therefore, all Amazight are really Arab in origin, making Morocco
a purely Arab country. This argument, coupled with the previous statement
that all "Arabs" in Morocco are Amazight, is a function of (or leads into) a more
positive attitude towards Arabization. Until recently, people would declare
themselves to be Arabs as soon as they could due to urban living and language
usage. Although the peaceful conversion model does not explicitly label the
Amazight in any negative way, it does stress the method for an Amazight to
become Arab rather than placing value on Amazight origins.
Bouchara, Mohammed's younger sister by ten years, is a good
spokesperson for the alternate viewpoint, as well as the active Amazight pride
of her generation. She saw a version of Arabization that included a violent,
drawn out war and ended with a few Arabs ruling tyrannical over a people
.~"--- ----~.~ '- ....

that had previously lived on their own land, speaking their own language, and
following their own law. All of Morocco was in a similar situation under the
French Protectorate, by which time the Amazight were well versed in
integration. Madame Chaoui, an Arab that grew up during the French

------"
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protectorate and hates to speak French despite fluency, also sees Arabization
somewhat in this way, with the Arabs forcing the Amazight to move to the
mountains.

Contemporary Ramifications
The French Protectorate was seen by most as a time that has passed,
but has left a legacy significant to the Arabs more than the Amazight. It is the
Arabs that are seen as having adopted cultural traits from the French. More
significantly, it is the Arabs that are seen as taking over the Western style
political structure and cultural traits that the French left behind. It is at this
point in Moroccan history that political domination of the Arabs began (at
least in the perception of the people I spoke to). Mohammed related that until
the 1940's many Amazight still lived under tribal law. A historical theme
became important at this point, with ramifications that reach into the present
situation. There were always tribes that did not pay allegiance to the ruling
power; it was not until after exhaustive French efforts that the entire
population was under one government for the very first time.
In the early years of the protectorate, the French met resistance from
the Arab ruling elite and the Amazight, but these resistances were separate.
Edmund Burke, in his case study of the resistance by the Ait Ndhir (an
Amazight tribe), points to the bitterness towards the Arabs and to the threat
of control by the French. Sultan Mohammed IV had attempted to impose
taxation and administration of the Ait Ndhir in an effort to fortify against the
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French; this was perceived as a threat to tradition existence, and resisted
(Burke 1991: 132). Additionally, the French began an armed campaign to
seize lands that was never entirely successful (Burke 1991: 144). The reason
that the Amazight resistance was so successful lies in the ethnic characteristic
of the Amazight. The religious practices of the Amazight connected them
through a network of similar mystical brotherhoods, but did not establish
strong ties to the Arabic "high Islam" they theoretically practiced. Secondly,
the history of the relationship between the Ait Ndhir and the Moroccan state
(in all its forms as dynasties rose and fell) had never been strong. This is
similar to the pattern of "dissident Berber tribes" who prefer their structured
independence to state domination. Lastly, their geographical position had
directly effected the economic position of the Ait Ndhir. They were excluded
~.---"'

from the vast wealth that could be found in cities, but gained a lucrative
position as middlemen between Marrakech and Meknes, only enhanced by
their transhumant nomadism (Burke 1991: 142-144). These elements enabled
the segmentary tribe to unite under adversity and unite around some of the
markers of Amazight ethnicity.
By employing a simple political theory of domination, the French took
advantage of this strife and divided the population to gain tighter control.
During the early part of the Protectorate, the ethnic groups in Morocco were
gradually manipulated to the advantage of the colonial power. The French
"converted markets into effective points of tribal control" by exerting their
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military and governmental presence at the souk (Hart 1972: 35). This is why
in the 1930 French law referred to as the "Berber Dahir" (law) met with much
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protest from both Arabs and Amazight. As the law officially recognized the
authority and continuation of customary law and tribunals of Amazight tribes
only, it would seem logical that the fiercely non-Arab population would
welcome this validation, but they did not as it inhibited the struggle for
independence, which had become a common cause of Arab and Amazight in
direct proportion to the squeezing of the French on the power of Morocco. This
independence movement correlates strongly to the trend throughout Amazight
history of resisting the domination of a state or other tribal unit seeking to
seize more power.
The historical factors and the events of the French Protectorate had the
net effect of bringing the Amazight under complete control of the Arabs for the
first time. The Arabs gained control of the existing structures forseveral
reasons. They had'been subject to French law for decades longer than many
Amazight, so were more familiar with it. More importantly, they were the
inhabitants of the urban areas, where the French had concentrated their
infrastructure and political development. Many have the opinion that the
French structure and its remnants denied and continue to deny Amazight
access to self-determination and effective political and economic power since
the end of tribal law .

')
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Those who saw Arabization as peaceful seem less resentful of the
molding of Morocco into a Western style but still Islamic state after
independence. Proponents of the unwilling conquest of Amazight Morocco by
Arabs, who mostly belong to the younger generation, see Arabs as unfairly
dominating Moroccan politics after a long history of futile attempts that the
traditional structures successfully repelled for centuries.
The difference in perception and reaction may also lie in the nature of
the domination. The French Protectorate did not include heavy settling of
Morocco by the French. Instead, domination was almost purely political and
military. However, the relationship between Arabs and Amazight bears the
hallmarks of an ethnic conflict. Using Baaklini's model, the ethnic groups
involved have acted in many respects like a political actor, and not merely as
culture bearing units. Moreover, the French Protectorate did enact Baaklini's
processes. The united independence movement was an example of "secular
and nationalist forces appealing across ethnic boundaries (Baaklini 1983: 54).
The new Morocco turned to a political system dependent on a power and
...

-

charismatic leader, the (now"" King:' Mohammed V, and then his son Hassan II.
\-_/

Baaklini would term their rules "integrative institutions". Following the
pattern suggested in this model, the conflict had worsened in the wake of these
movements. An exploration of the contemporary relationship between the
Amazight and the government elaborates this worsening of ethnic
relationships.
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IV:

Amazight Identity and Government Today
The Relationship between Amazight identity and the Moroccan

government is seen differently by almost all of my informants. The differences
seem to stem from the fact that, perhaps counter intuitively, the government is
more overtly present in rural areas. For example, during my time in Morocco,
I spent three months in the city of Rabat without any formalized government
contact, yet in Oulmes, a rural village in which I stayed in for five days, I was
summoned by the authorities six times for no apparent reason. These
summons seemed to have been made purely to demonstrate the power of the
qaid. He just wanted to try out his few words of English or ask if I was

enjoying myself (of course not until I had waited an appropriately long time).2
Perceptions of the interconnection of government and Amazight identity
correlate to the Arab/urban Amazight/rural and class connections.
Morocco today is governed by constitutional monarchy; however, it is
one much further towards the absolute monarch end of the spectrum than to
the figurehead end. Internationally, Morocco lies somewhat in the middle of
the road, trying to maintain closet ties to the West while also identifying "with
the aspirations of the Arab world, including the call for Arab unity, opposition
to Zionism, pride in a common cultural, religious, historical, and linguistic
heritage, and a desire to assert an authentic Arab identity" (Entelis 1989:
101). Note that this agenda leaves little room for an international statement

2 However, this did afford the opportunity to observe the qaid in action. I saw who was seen
first, who got a shared audience, who saw the qaid alone, etc.
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of the Amazight-ness of Morocco. The king is the clear driving force behind the
country's political and governmental decision. The power of King Hassan II is
bolstered by the magnificent flying buttress of god given right. The king is a
Sharif, a descendant of the prophet (and therefore Arab), and his job comes
with the title "Commander of the Faithful"; the faithful being the Muslims
that make up 99 percent of the Moroccan population. It is illegal to denounce
the king, and Morocco does hold political prisoners.3 All this makes it unlikely
that anyone will publicly criticize the king . Abdul prefaced a scathing critique
of the government with the statement "the King is very intelligent and a
wonderful person, but those around him - the ministers and all those people are corrupt." The last part of this statement is a sentiment overwhelmingly
shared. The government is seen as badly run, disorganized, and corrupt.
The circles of the government extending from the king, the object of the
scorn of the people, are also likely to be Arab. Education, wealth, and urban
living all aid in developing the social and political rank necessary to become
powerful. Interestingly, the one sector of the King Hassan II's government
that was dominated by the Amazight for many years was the military. Entelis
explains this, "their ethnolinguisitic origin is less important then their
extremely conservative and nationalistic political views, which stress the need
for discipline, honesty, and sacrifice at the expense of democracy, liberty, and
justice" (Entelis 1989: 89). These comments applied to the Amazight at the

In recent years, Morocco has come under considerable international pressure to clean up its
human right record.

3
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beginning of the modern era of Morocco as it emerged from a long battle for
independence from the French. However, the current state of the Amazight's
concept of their ethnicity and position in the power structure leads to demands
for greater say in the governance of a country they see as their own. This,
coupled with Baaklini's model, explains why the relationship between the king
and the Amazight dominated army quickly became unstable. In 1963,1971,
1972, and 1983 either plots were uncovered or military coups were actually
attempted. All these movements were lead by Amazight military officers
(Entelis 1989: 89-90). Now the military seems loyal, but is also more Arab. In
this case, the exclusion of Amazight from positions of power is overt, but also
suggestive of the more subtle trend for Arab domination of the government.
Government of rural areas also responds to the ethnicity based power
structure of Morocco. In the rural areas I have visited, such as Setti Fadma
and Oulmes, the Qaid is an extremely important figure. Interestingly, the
title is the same as that of a political figure who governed approximately the
same jurisdiction under traditional tribal governments. The permission of the
qaid, and appointed official usually drawn from outside the district--ostensibly
as the position requires education, is required for any number of things. If one
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wants to build a house, start a business, etc. the must seek the permission of
the qaid. The qaid can request anyone's presence, as he did in my case, and
usually gets it, even with much grumbling on the way. The people have a
great deal of respect for this office, perhaps related to it position in their
~

heritage and the power of the national government. Bila said "the people here
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[in Setti Fadma] think that the government is a bit like god- you have to do
what is says."
.....-".~

Government is certainly a heavy handed presence, but the people do not
feel it is connected to them. When this meets with the independent spirit that
the Amazight feel characterizes them and a lack of education and the
empowerment that comes with it, resentment is created. While this is mostly
a function of rural living (as the rural population is so far from major cities
where the real political power rests), most rural families are Amazight.
Setti Fadma has recently been the victim of worse than usual annual
floods. Many people died, and much property was destroyed. Abdul told me
that he knew European countries had sent money to Morocco for the town, but
nobody had received any. He feels this is because of the corrupt government's
assumption that the town would be too naive to figure it out. While Abdul has
figured it out, he does not know what to do about it.
Many of the people that I talked to felt that the end of the French
Protectorate had left not only the Arabs, but the mostly urban, upper class
elite in control of Morocco. They feel excluded from politics, but the young aim
to fight their way in. Bouchara represents the opinion that pressure should be
put on the king through student activism, academic and intellectual circles,
etc. Although the king had already recognized the cultural heritage of Morocco
in declaring his own Amazight roots, even stating that Amazight languages
should enter schools, nothing has changed. That King Hassan II said this at
all is a remarkable statement on the increasing political and cultural saliency
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of Amazight identity. His dynasty came to power by appealing to their status
of Sharif. As direct descendants of the prophet, they are by definition Arab.
Yet, the king is now willing to attach an Amazight component to his selfidentity. Bouchara believes that if Amazight issues became a priority for King
Hassan II or his successor, Amazights would "rise to the top." I also met a
group of students who believe that revolution is the only to fix the grave flaws
~-,
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in it sees in Moroccan politics and the hierarchical society that uphold it. This
society is one made of a rigid class structure based on ethnicity.
The present construction of the government affects and is affected by
Amazight ethnicity in several ways. The present king belongs to a lineage
that rose to power through and appeal to the purity of its Arab-ness. As direct
descendants of the Prophet, they are in a sense entitled to power, by virtue of
being Arab. In addition, the king is supported by a network of ministers, etc.
that is drawn from the upper class, educated, urban level of Moroccan society.
This level is predominantly Arab. This same association of the Arabs to urban
and Amazight to rural also accounts for another factor on the relationship
between the Amazight and the government. As a rural, undereducated group,
they are subject to more controlling government and the effects of
governmental corruption.

<..,
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Chapter Four:

I:

Finding Amazight Ethnicity

Perceptions of Amazight Identity
In the course of this research, the hardest question to find an answer to

was "what is an Amazight?" Everyone I spoke to and most scholarly materials
agree that there is a "profound ethnic split in Moroccan Society between Arabs
and Berbers" (Burke qtd. in Seddon, 1981: 29). However, the difference is hard
to define, either subjectively or objectively. Perhaps the prevailing definition
is "Not Arab", but this is not very enlightening. "Amazight" has emerged in
the Post-Colonial period

as~mportant

concept in the politics and culture of

Morocco. Additionally, the heritage of segmentary lineage and tribal
organization had strong effects today. While the social relevance of Amazight
ethnicity has been shown, it is not a simplistic exercise to demonstrate the
cultural significance. Both cultural and social dimensions are required to
achieve "ethnic group" standing. Starr's "checklist", the four criteria for an
ethnic group, and problems of ethnic boundaries provide the theoretical
background for this exploration. Amazight ethnic identity is a broad and
significant cultural concept. Although it rests on self-identification, the
psycho-cultural, linguistic, and religious components of Amazight life are
unique to them.
Many have reduced Amazight cultural identity to the languages. For
example, Lakhsassi, a respected Morocco professor of religion who is of
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Amazight origin, denied that there could possibly be any other measure of
ethnic identity other than daily use of the language. I engaged him in debate
on this point, citing examples of people who claimed an Amazight identity but
did not speak that language. He declared this "impossible." My point that if I
spoke an Amazight language as my daily language, I still would not be
Amazight was agreed to by him, demonstrating that he had an underlying
concept of cultural identity that he failed to recognize consciously (Lakhsassi
1996). I relate this exchange as it demonstrates the extent to which language
is used to denote identity.
This language restricted definition of identity is completely inadequate
as it disregards other aspects of Amazight culture. Anna, a Peace Corps
volunteer working in the Amazight village of Setti Fadma and its environs,
who stated emphatically "a Berber is some one who speaks the language of
course" would be very surprised to hear H alid say "although I do not speak
Berber, I am Berber, My mother and father are Berber and raised me in their
tradition." Further, there are Amazight groups, such as "most of the Jebala-

.

Chornara-Riffian Tribes" who now use Arabic as there primary (or even only)
language, but "still retain the rest of their culture" (Hoffman 1967: 22). It is
this "rest of their culture" that must be define being Amazight.

Markers of Ethnicity
Significantly, Moroccans put themselves and others into ethnic
categories; yet the question "how can you tell if someone is Arab or Amazight
(Berber)?'~

was almost universally answered "you cannot", or at least one can
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not know by looking. In Setti Fadma, Jamal told me that it is easier to tell in
the mountains. The men wear jellabahs (a hooded over garment usually
described by Westerners as being like a bathrobe), gondoras (a simple shift
like garment), traditiof\hoes, and carry a small leather bag slung over the
should like a saddle bag (usually described by shopkeepers, Jamal, and others

----

as "an Amazight bag"). Only Arab women wear the jellabah, added Chebib.
In the village, I saw many women wearing that traditional head scarf, jewelry
and other clothing. In addition, the older women in Amazight tribes are still
tattooed with the facial markings designating their tribe. That the younger
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women do not should not be seen as a sign of reduction of ethnic or tribal

.----

significance; rather, it signifies the spread of a Western beauty ideal and the
success of a public health campaign against the practice. Ultimately, most
people said that they had to talk to a person; if their language did not make it
obvious "the way that they think" will make it instantly obvious (Saied).

Ethnic Boundaries and Maintenance of Ethnic Identity
There is frequent intermarriage further blurring the lines between
Amazight and Arab. (Although most Amazight said that they would prefer to
marry another Amazight, preferably from the same area/tribe.) Salat said that
due to intermarriage there are hardly any pure Arabs "perhaps one in a
thousand." Mohammed M. said "I am an Arab-Amazight-Moroccan. I am half
Amazight because my mother is Amazight, and half Arab because my father is
Arab. The left side of me is Amazight and the right side is Arab. I say this
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because the right side is stronger as it came from my father." This statement
is revealing on many different levels. It comes from the context of a strongly
patrilineal society, which partially explains the dominance of the Arab aspect
of his heritage. Yet, there are other issues at work.

Basic Value Orientation
Amazights selected a set of characteristics as descriptive of their ethnic
group. These characteristics were often stated in opposition to those found in
Arabs. To list a few, Amazight see themselves as generous, honest, and
patient. To be an excellent host is a top priority for Moroccans in general, but
these characteristics better equip Amazights (in their opinion anyway) to
reach this ideal. In addition, they see themselves as living in the present
without looking forward and thus causing themselves to worry. They do not
miss what they never had, leading simple lives. This means that Amazight s
are happier than Arabs. 4 Chebib summed it up as Amazight are always on the
"straight and narrow"5 while Arabs zigzag. Omar stated that Amazight are
just nicer than Arabs for three reasons. First, they are fundamentally nice
people . Second, Arabs are pretentious in manner and self conscious. This
means that to accept the hospitality of an Arab is an uncomfortable
experience. "There are certain things you have to do in their homes, and you
always have to be careful how you hold yourself' he said. In addition, one is
never invited into the home without an ulterior motive. On the other hand, in

4

5

All the characteristics listed here were cited by at least two people.
A loose translation of a French idiom into an English one
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an Amazight home one is free to do as they please. His characterization
echoes the theme of the happy, generous Amazight leading a simpler and
therefore better life. Finally, Amazight are more flexible, quick learners, and
easily integrate into any situation. James Miller cites this characteristic a
being key to a Moroccan tribe. Growth, movement, and social flexibility
enable the continuity of the tribe (Miller 1984: 56).
The last point is interesting when considered in light of another widely
cited Amazight characteristic, freedom
and independence.
Many of my
.
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informants were adamant that Amazight do not live under the control of
others, contradicting history a nd also their own laments about Arab
domination of the political and economic spheres. There is way to reconcile
this paradox. In the Amazight tradition, "ultimately each household or tent
was its own republic" (Nelson 1985: 5). The Amazight currently feel in control
of their own families, homes, and flocks, even towns, but also feel disassociated
from more regional or national issues. Chebib said "Amazight do not think
much about politics-it is not important here in the mountains." Tempering this
is the integrationist survival tactic of the Amazight peoples; for it is they who
have learned Arabic, not the Arabs who have learned Amazight languages. To
retain their own household size "republics", they have quickly adapted to keep
others away from the core of their lives and beliefs. In turn, this process has
maintained their ethnicity. However, as with other Amazight issues, the
younger generation are taking a more active interest in the higher level
political concerns.
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Culturally, Amazight perceive themselves to be different from Arabs,
yet this is not always valid. For example, the famous Amazight hospitality
always includes the (in)famous mint tea. Often the subject of "Moroccan wine"
or "Berber whisky" quips, the Amazight claim the tea as their own tradition.
When I pointed out to Omar that I had frequently drunk tea with Arabs and in
Arab homes, he agreed "yes, but it's different. They serve it in cups not
glasses. " Many other claim that the difference lies in the preparation (with
the Amazight tea being superior, of course). The word commonly used to
describe this difference of preparation was usually doucement no matter what
language the interview was being conducted in. Doucement literally translate
to "gently", but in Moroccan usage has the connotation of "with care and
attention, calmly." This harkens back to the self-description of the Amazight
people are simpler, slower, and living in the present. Interestingly, the Arabs
do not (in my experience anyway) prepare or serve their tea any differently.
Furthermore, tea was actually introduced into Morocco via Portuguese and
Dutch traders on a Europe-China route in the seventeenth century (Loument
1994: 43). This is one example of several that suggest that both the Arabs and
Amazight deny their mutual influences upon each other or from the outside.
Barth identifies a 'basic value orientation" as a marker of ethnicity. In
this case, a code of values was not easily discernible. However, comments of
both Amazight and Arabs made it obvious that there was a cultural concept of
the philosophical nature of being Amazight. Although the psycho-cultural
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differences between the ethnic groups was at times overstated, this is onto
itself interesting. In addition, positive and negative value judgments were
made of perceived cultural traits. This trend demonstrates that the cultural
and "value" differences themselves are less important than the emic perception
of these differences.

Significance of Amazight Ethnicity
The significance of Amazight identity seems to be changing. People
were quick to tell

m~

that they are Amazight (even before I brought up my

interest in the topic) while no one told me unprompted that he or sheis Arab.
Anna, upon hearing what I was doing in Setti Fadma, exclaimed "people will
actually tell you that they are Berber?! Most people try to hide it." She went
on to describe how most people will jump to claim Arab ethnicity as soon as
they put a little distance between the mountains and themselves. No
Amazight or Arab personally expressed this sentiment to me, but did make
reference to this feeling in the not too distant past or as one that is a function
of Arabs sense of superiority. "They," said Allal, who does not like his name as
it is Arabic, "have erased our identity. To say that you are Amazight is to put
yourself in the lowest position. But I refuse to stay there." This expressed
vividly expresses the pride in Amazight identity that I discerned in most
people.

Common History as a Source of Group Cohesion
Much of this pride stems from the Amazight position in history. My
informants were proud to tell me that the Amazight were the first inhabitants
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of Morocco. This is in direct contradiction with the prevailing scholarly
opinion that states "the fact that the Berbers are the original inhabitants of
North Mrica ... is not mirrored in the folk mind" (Entelis 1989: 25). Moreover,
the Amazight resented the Arabs for taking a dominant role. Great pride was
expressed in the Amazight ruling dynasties. Aziz said "we ruled this country
weIland spread Islam; we did not really need the Arabs." Allal sang a song in
Amazight that he translated as "we don't want your Islam, we don't want you
..-language, go away and leave us alone." Clearly Amazight identity is a source
of pride for many people.

Urban and Rural Divide
Halid, who now lives in Rabat, told me that although he is Amazight, it
did not matter as he lives in the city. This stresses the association of Arabs
with urban areas, and Amazight with rural areas. Even in Setti Fadma,
people told me that the "true" Amazight were those living in the mountains,
living a simple life, and descending to the weekly souk, also described as a
fundamentally Amazight event (Jamal and Bila). Yet, Halid is not
representative. Most people stress the retention of Amazight identity even
after urbanization.
Even given the urban/rural associations, my informants generally saw
Amazights as retaining their culture and traditions more strongly than the
Arabs. Not only do they associate Arabs with urban living, but the next step is
that Arabs look to Europe and America for models. An Amazight I met in
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Marrakech was adamant that even urban Amazight are retaining their
heritage. Jamal said that people might assume that he is Arab as he
habitually wears Western clothing demonstrating this pervasive Western/Arab
association. Despite this and their classification of mountain dwellers as
"real" Amazight, both small town and city inhabitants thought of themselves
as Amazight. Many of the Amazight families I spoke to had a home in the
town or city as well as a home in the mountains. I met a family in Oulmes in
which the Amazight man has two wives. The Amazight wife lives in the
mountains while the Arab wife live in town with all the modern conveniences.
Another family I know in Rabat considers themselves to be Amazight,
although the children do not speak Amazight. They remain connected to the
countryside, bled, and thus their Amazight identity, by family members
outside Khemisset whom they visit often. These ties to the bled allow
Amazight to feel that they are retaining their culture and also strengthens
Arab/urban Amazight/rural correlations.
Historically, patterns of Arabs and Amazights vying for power have
placed them in competitive situations based more on tribal than ethnic
divisions. The French played upon this competitive history for their benefit,
but defined ethnicity as the criteria. Now that this competitive spirit is
restricted within the political boundaries of modern Morocco, ethnic division is
emphasized. Younger Amazight are taking increasing pride in their identity
as Amazight. Although the generation before them united with the Arabs to
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seek freedom from the French, the young generations want equal say in the
new state but as a separate category from their former allies. While Amazight
identity may currently be seen through language, self identification is to an
ever increasing degree the defining characteristic and grounds for pride.
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II:

Language
Amazight languages are fundamental to Amazight identity. Many

scholars consider language to be the only marker of ethnicity in Morocco. For
example, Lakhsassi, Entelis, and others would agree with the conclusion that
the Amazight are "a composite people; ... the affinity among the various people
seems to be solely linguistic" (Nelson 1985: 4). Additionally, many people I
spoke to immediately jumped on the linguistic component as soon as I began to
describe my interest in the Amazight in Morocco today. They told me stories
of Americans that spoke Amazight and took great delight in making me use
my few words of Shluha (central Moroccan Amazight) and teaching me more.
Many were particularly interested in teaching me the Amazight alphabet.
Virtually all the Amazight I spoke to denied that language alone made

~

Amazight, but language clearly holds a great deal of significance and is a
source of pride. As an objective marker, many have seized upon language as a
symbol for more general Amazight identity.
Scholars of Morocco (and Moroccans) generally consider there to be
three distinct regions of Amazight peoples that constitute equally distinct
cultural groups. Equally, they speak three different languages. The three
zones are usually labeled Riffian, located in the Rif Mountains of northern
Morocco, Imazighen or Berber living on the east side of the High Atlas and in
the Middle Atlas mountains, and finally the Shluh of the western High Atlas,
Ante Atlas, and Southern Morocco (Hoffman 1967: 22-28). Whether the
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spoken languages constitute languages or dialects of the same language is the
subject of much debate outside the scope of this discussion, but they do differ
significantly. Even within the three major groups, wide variation exists. Each
tribe has a slightly different vocabulary set and pronunciation according to
Mohammed who wrote an unpublished dissertation on this topic. However,
most of my informants claimed that all Amazight languages are mutually
intelligible, although Riffian forms are the most different. "I might not be able
to really discuss with him, but I understand what he means. After a month or
two I would be fluent," said Omar of a conversation he was having with a
Sous. 6
The Amazight languages are considered by their speakers (and
increasingly others) to be rich and beautiful languages utilizing much poetic
imagery and rhythmic inflection patterns. This is why Amazight music and
poetry are so valued by all Moroccans, Salat (an Arab) pointed out. Bouchara
told me that in the past Amazight languages were thought of only as dialects
and not "real" languages, lacking grammar, rich vocabulary, alphabet, and
other characteristics thought to be required for advanced language status. In
fact all these characteristics are true of these languages, including an alphabet
specifically designed for Amazight languages. Additionally, Arabic, Latin, and
international phonetic alphabets are used for transcription. This has been
done for a variety of Amazight publication, including a now defunct Amazight

6 The Sous are an Amazight group living in Southern Morocco, stereotypically good business
people who have established epicerie (small grocery stores) throughout the urban areas.
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newspaper printed in Arabic script. Interestingly, u nder the same criteria
applied above, Derija is "only a dialect, not a real language" as it is not a
written language under any circumstances.
Amina, an Arab, told me that her father used to work in a book shop in
Rabat that carried Amazight publications. When they began teaching
Amazight languages, the owner was arrested and the shop closed. This
occurred about seven years ago; however, the status of the languages has
changed considerably in the intervening time. The year of this research,
1996, was the debut of a daily ten minute newscast in an Amazight language
on Moroccan national television. Bouchara explained that this came about
following a strong movement among Algerian Amazight university students to
reclaim their language and identity as part of a national political movement
for Amazight power. The Moroccan government began the newscast because
"when they saw this, they knew that it was a good t hing." A more cynical
interpretation would be that the Moroccan government wished to prevent
similar uprisings within its potentially unstable borders. She saw in this
immense hope for the acceptance of Amazight language and heritage in
Moroccan. Her enthusiasm was infectious when she spoke of rumors that
Amazight languages will become an official course of study at some Moroccan
universities (all but one of which are state institutions) in the 1997-1998
academic year. Even if the rumors are unfounded, that they exist
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demonstrates clearly the increased value of Amazight language and heritage
in Moroccan national opinion.

Language and Education
Language and education create many controversial issue in the
extremely polyglot Moroccan society. Often, when a n Amazight begins school
he or she can speak only one of the Amazight languages. However, few
teachers speak any Amazight language, nor is it permitted in the classroom
(even as a teaching tool). Moroccan Arabic is used to teach Modern Standard
Arabic (MSA, Fousha), the language of education and the upper classes.
Before this is fully mastered, students begin to learn French. Karima, a
French teacher in a rural college (the rough equivalent of a middle school in
the Moroccan interpretation of the French school system), cited this as her
major problem in the classroom, the source of behavioral problems and
inability to learn. Ali told me of his first few years in school. He felt
frustrated and stupid as he struggled to understand what was happening in
the classroom. He was physically punished by his teachers for speaking
Amazight in the classroom. He resorted to getting older friends to recap the
day's events in his native language as they made the three kilometer hike back
to their homes. He persevered and is how a graduate student. However, his
sister went to school for only one year but could not learn anything. As
mandatory education is rarely enforced in Morocco (especially for rural
females), her formal education ended there. This is one of the ways in which
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the Amazight, intentionally or not, may be marginalized by the structure of
the Moroccan state.
Several movements have begun that would make education in Amazight
languages available, at least to teach children enough Arabic to enter the
existing schools. Jamal told me with great pride of a school conducted in
Amazight in Agadir, and expressed a desire that more would be created. He
saw Arabic as the unifying language of Morocco (given that the three major
Amazight languages vary considerably) and therefore it was logical for higher
education to be in Arabic. This view was shared by most of the people with
whom I spoke.

Daily Language
This raises this issue of daily language. Abdulillah, studying for his
Masters in English, said "When I was younger, I used four languages
everyday: Amazight at home, Derija walking to school, Fousha and French at
school." The majority of people gave less inclusive descriptions of their
language use. Most claimed that they used their native language most of the
time. However, my observations showed that many, such as Aziz and Fetiha,
actually used Derija in equal or greater frequency with each other, friends,
family, etc. Another common attitude was to make the explicit decision not to
speak Arabic. Arabic is Omar's last choice language. He would rather use
French or English with a fellow Moroccan even if Arabic would be a less
demanding choice. Jamal also cited rejection of Arabic. In Agadir, when a
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different Amazight form than his native is spoken, he asks for prices in his
Amazight rather than Arabic else he will be overcharged. He and others
described Agadir as a center of Amazight activism where European languages
are more widely spoken t han Arabic. The most interesting case of politically
motivated language choice I encountered was that of an eight year old girl.
We were sitting next to each other on a long bus trip. When I tried to speak to
her in Arabic, 7 she told me in French that she did not speak Arabic. Upon
questioning, I learned that she was Amazight, and that her father was a
politician who did not want her to speak Arabic. She attended a French
speaking private school. From these examples, it seems that Derija is by
necessity the common language, almost a lingua franca, of virtually all
Moroccans. However, many Amazight would rather not use it -- or at least
prefer to think that they do not speak Derija -- except when necessary.
Amazight languages provide a more objective method of measuring
Amazight identity than any other method and are a source of great pride for
speakers. However, there is much more to Amazight ethnicity than merely
language. Although forced by school and circumstance to speak forms of
Arabic, the Amazight continue to see their languages as the most important
means of communication in daily life.

7 This was for two reasons. First, I found practicing Arabic with children to be simpler than
with adults. Also, I assumed that Arabic could be her only language as we were on a bus
between two urban areas and that French instruction does not begin until about that age.
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III: Religion
Islam as a faith and as a way of life is the common thread among
ninety-nine percent of Moroccans. Miller describes Islam as "a socially
organizing force of spiritual and universalizing intensity, the integrator"
(Miller 1984: 198). As inhabitants of an Islamic state, all children are
educated in the public schools to be Muslims. Individuals are legally
considered to be Muslim by default, and as such are required to fast during
Ramadan. They also view the king as both their political and spiritual ruler.
"We are all Muslims, so there is no difference [between ethnic groups]" said
Anas in the course of a conversation in which he also labeled himself a
militant Amazight. On one level, Islam does unify all Moroccans as well as
legitimizing the power of their king through his role of "Commander of the
Faithful"; however, there are significant differences in local practice of Islam
that separates the Amazight even in the religious sphere.
Tombs to saints and the religious brotherhoods attached to them
constitute the greatest difference at the "Little Tradition" level from the
Qur'anically prescribed Islam. These tombs, referred to as marabouts (as are
the saints themselves), dot the bled (countryside) and occasionally pop up in
the cities. The tombs are objects of hope, sacrifice, pilgrimage, and even
worship. This practice is not prescribed by the Qur'an, and some schools of
Islamic thinking feel that it is condemned. Yet these tombs and the
moussems, festivals held in honor of the marabouts, form the core of the
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religious practice of (rural in particular) Amazight. Setti Fadma is overlooked
by a marabout on a mountainside. This tomb is the focus of one of the most
important moussem in Morocco.
Although Arabs now practice some of the saint worship and are
members of brotherhoods, the tradition is believed to have grown out of preIslamic Amazight beliefs. With the expense and difficulty associated with a
pilgrimage to Mecca, it is possible to make pilgrimages to five specific holy
sites in Morocco instead. Four of these sites are marabouts. These sites also
offer a direct sense of participation to its followers, particularly women who
are generally illiterate and not competent users of Arabic, let alone classical
Qur'anic Arabic. Amazightare also associated with less than mainstream
Islamic beliefs. Sufism8 has "found particularly fertile ground in the
traditions and superstitions of the Berbers. There is little doubt that the cults
that prosper in Morocco do so in mostly Berber areas" (Simonis and Crowther
1995: 38).
Moreover, these religious practices have been used by Amazight in their
political agenda. "At various times in Moroccan history the Berber's separatist
aspirations and their reactions against Arab authority ... have expressed
themselves through the heretical and schismatic doctrines of particularly vivid
Berber holy men" who probably went on to become saints and the center of
religious brotherhood practices (Nelson 1985: 137).

Sufism is the mystical i'brand" ofIslam. It may pre-date Islam but has integrated just as the
marabout practice has.

8

~
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As Jamal pointed out, it is theologically mandated that the Qur'an be in
Arabic and for Islam to be practiced in Arabic. However, at the mosque in
Setti Fadma, the verse of the Qur'an at prayers is explained in Amazight,
otherwise a significant number of people would not understand. This is yet
another example of slight tweaking of traditional Islamic doctrine that harbors
traditional Amazight beliefs. Therefore, at the philosophical level, Morocco is
united by Islam, but daily practice differs by ethnic affiliation.
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IV:

Conclusions
This chapter addressed the cultural components of Amazight ethnicity.

In conjunction with the earlier chapters, it has been demonstrated that the
Amazight are indeed a distinct ethnic group. This has been accomplished in
the following manner. To look first to the definition of "ethnic group"
predominant in the literature, the Amazight do meet the four criteria. They
live in largely self-perpetuating biological populations. A strong expression of
shared cultural beliefs and values was discerned. These were expressed in
both overt cultural forms and unique cultural forms such as the Fantasia. A
field of communication and interaction has been defined, largely a result of
their unique languages. Finally, the Amazight have designated and identify
themselves with a distinct category. Further, these factors are used for social
organization.
In the case of Starr's checklist, the case of the Amazight expresses these
items. The Amazight do speak a distinct language, and express varying
vocabulary sets. Dress and tattoos may be distinctive features. Moreover, the
Amazight show distinct residence patterns, living predominately together and
in rural areas, thus associating the group with a community. Finally, names
may be Arab or Amazight. As a result of Islam, many Amazight have Arab
names, but the owners of these names may resist the connotation.
Barth, in his discussion of ethnic groups and boundaries stresses the
shared cultural beliefs that were demonstrated in this case. Most important,
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Barth stresses self-identification, which is most certainly present in this case
study. His concepts of situational ethnicity and flow across boundaries aimed
at protecting the core ethnicity are also demonstrated in this case.
However, to reduce this analysis to proving a statement of ethnicity
would show it to be a futile exercise. The significance of this and other
ethnicities is not the definition, but the causes and effects of that ethnicity.
This area with be addressed in the next section.

~.
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Chapter Five:

Conclusions

I am an Arab-Berber-Moroccan. I am half Arab because my
father is Arab and half Berber because my mother is Berber.
The left side of me is Berber and the right side if Arab. I say
this because the right side is stronger as it came from my
Father
--Mohammed M.
These words convey the essence of Amazight identity in Morocco as I
found it. No ethnic group can define and place itself without the historical and
political context. History reveals a long tradition of independence; but one
that is little known in Morocco today. Akhmed, almost angrily, asked me what
I knew of Amazight history that justified my ability to conduct this project.
When I gave him a brief summary, he shook his head and looked to the ground
with tears in his eyes. "You," he said, "know more about the history of my
people than my children. This is a sad time for me."
His children do not know this history for several reasons. Ethnographic
and political analysis of Amazight peoples are nor readily available in Morocco
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(Moudden: 1996). However, if they were many Amazight would not be able to
read them. Education conducted in a non-native language marginalizes many
directly out off the schools, while devaluing an important aspect of selfidentity.
The Amazight also generally inhabit rural areas, once again a function \.
history, where resources are simply unavailable. Mter a period of

~
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marginalization following independence, the young Amazight are seeking to
find power. They are using their identity of a differentiated ethnic group as a
vehicle to achieve their goal of equal involvement at all levels of Moroccan
society. As contemporary life and world view have expanded Amazight
horizons beyond their traditional lands, rather than seek and return, they are
applying tradition models to the current situation.
Given that the Amazight are the earliest known inhabitants of Morocco,
one might wonder why now is the time for this movement. The French
Protectorate was a pivotal point in the history of the Amazight in the system
that is modern Morocco. Under the French, ethnic differences were
highlighted by the "Berber Dahir". Moreover, the French were the first power
to effectively control the entire population, and left this control to the Arab
urban elite. Thus, the Amazight are struggling for the first time to assert
their identity and, following a common pattern of many societies, the younger
generations have taken up this fight. Like Mohammed M., Morocco is
increasingly recognizing that the Amazight side is integral to its state level
identity and functioning. The Arab side may stronger, although not greater,
but the left side is seeking equal prominence.
The true significance of ethnicity is in these roots. The historical,
political, and economic issues form a cyclic and reciprocal relationship. Events
support an ethnic distinction, and the ethnic distinction creates other events.
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In this case, a long thread of historical conditions has supported an
ethnic identity. In the Post Colonial period, an intricate expression of
ethnicity has developed. The struggle for independence from the French
created a unity between Arabs and Amazight. Yet, as Baaklini predicted, this
system actually served to accentuate the ethnic differences. In a political,
economic, and cultural system that has left the Amazight feeling marginalized,
renewed interest in their ethnic identity as a means for self empowerment has
arisen in what may be called the third immigrant generation. In this
situation, we have a youth with a strong interest in perpetrating their
ethnicity. Although there is a strong correlation between urban-Arab and
rural-Amazightassociations, economic conditions are forcing urbanization.
The urbanized Amazight typically live in bidonvilles on the outskirts of the
cities and remain connected to their traditional roots (Entelis 1989: 107). As
they become more socialized into this urban, "modern" world, many are
redefining their ethnicity within this context.
According to Cohen, when "two ethnic groups join together and interact
politically and economically and establish a new political system, they will
soon become involved on cleavages on economic and political lines running
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throughout the extent of the new society" (Cohen 1974: 95). When these
cleavages transcend the ethnic group lines, they will form the new basis for
identity. Ethnic and tribal affiliations will gradually weaken and disappear
(Cohen 1974: 95). However, as in the Gase of the Amazight, if the difference~
coincide with the existing ethnic affiliations, the cultural differences will
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become "entrenched, consolidated and strengthened in order to articulate the
struggle between the two social groups across the new class lines" (Cohen
1974: 96). The ultimate expression of this is the militant Amazightism in
southern Morocco.
Ethnicity and politics are therefore inseparable. Without the political
conditions and interactions present in Morocco, Amazight would cease to be a
salient catagory. Modern ethnicity results not from isolation but from
interaction (Cohen 1974: 96). The dynamic relations of the group and their
culture with new positions of power places new emphasis on parts of the
traditional culture and structure. Essentially, ethnicity has become a political
organization, at least symbolically (Cohen 1974: 96-97).
Additionally, it is impossible to segregate these issues of ethnicity from
those of nationalism and state building. The increased militants in the south
may result from their proximity to the "Western Sahara Question." The
government as called upon a discourse of nationalism to elicit support for their
occupation of the Western Sahara, culminating in the Green March, a peaceful
civilian "invasion" of more than 100,000 people. This has linked the Amazight
into concepts of self-determination and nationalism. This does not imply that
they want separation from Morocco.
Indeed, they want just the opposite, closer integration into Moroccan
society. The Amazight see Morocco as "their" country. They are more than
willing to share it with their partners in religious activity and fundamental
beliefs a nd in the creation the independent Moroccan state, the Arabs.
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However, the Amazight wish to maintain a separate ethnicity and integrate
the concepts of their segmentary lineage based tribal heritag~ into the guiding
political concepts of the modern Morocco.
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Appendix II: List and Brief Biography of Cited Informants
Abdul a middle aged Amazight living in Setti Fadma
Abdulillah a student of English at the university in Kenitra, an Amazight
from Oulmes
Ali an Amazight with the same biography as above
Akhmed an Amazight living outside Oulmes, approximately 35 years old.
Studied Arabic literature at Al Karouain
Allal an Amazight living in Khemisset, a student at University of Mohammed
V in Rabat. He is a Marxist revolutionary and activist for the Amazight cause.
Amina a 21 year old Arab from Rabat
Anas an Amazight from Khemisset in his early 20's; a member of the upper
class
Anna an American Peace Corps volunteer posted in Setti Fadma
Aziz an Amazight from Khemisett, 35 years old
Bila a 30is Amazight working as a mountain guide in Setti Fadma who has
traveled throughout the world.
Bouchara a 24 year old Amazight; she wrote her BA dissertation on
Amazight poetry
Madame Chaoui an Arab in her late 40's educated at AI Karouain
Chebib a hotel owner in Setti Fadma from a mountain Amazight family, late
50's
Fetiha an Amazight woman in her twenties who lives in the bled outside
Khemisset.
Jamal an Amazight who runs a souvenir shop in Setti Fadma
Halid an Amazight from Khemisset, a student in Rabat, 23
Karima an Arab teacher of French in an Amazight area
Om~r

an Amazight rug dealer in Khemisset

Mohammed an Amazight French teacher, 35 years old
Mohammed M. a 22 year old student in Rabat. His comment grew out of
discussion of political correctness in the United States
Saied an Amazight in his mid twenties living in Setti Fadma.
Salat an Arab in his mid twenties vacationing in Setti Fadma. His was
educated in Italy.
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Appendix III:

Interview Questions

The following is a list of example questions that framed discussions with
informants. The list was compiled with the assistance of my adviser in
Morocco, Dr. Susan Schaefer Davis.

I know that there is a distinction between Arab and Amazight, which are you?
How important is this distinction to you?
What is uniquely Arab of Amazight, and not more generally Moroccan?
What is the most important thing about being Arab or Amazight?
What are the Characteristics of Amazight? Arabs?
How do you classify others?
How is it important to do that?
What is the significance of Amazight Culture and being member of that
culture?
How have Arabs and Amazight influence each other
Are people retaining their Amazight culture? How can you tell?
It seems that many Arab and Amazight traditions are the same. Can you
Explain this?

How do you see the future of the Amazight in Morocco?
What would you like the future of the Amazight in Morocco to be?

Language
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How important is Amazight language to Amazight culture?
Should schools be conducted in Amazight languages?
Should Amazight languages be taught in schools?
Tell me about written Amazight languages.
Whom did you last speak with, and in what language?

Marriage
Would you rather marry an Arab or an Amazight?
How are spouses chosen?
What are the differences between Arab and Amazight marriages?
What happens in a marriage ceremony?

Women
Are or should women be veiled?
Who gets tattooed and why?
Are less people getting tattooed now, and why?

Religion
Are Amazight of Arabs more religious?
Does the practice of Islam vary?
How do folk traditions effect Islam?
What do you think about translating the Qur'an into Amazight for
comprehension purposes?

Political Issues
Do you feel that Arabs and Amazights are treated differently by the
government?
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Have tribes remained important in Moroccan politics?
How large is your tribe?
Describe people's feelings about tribes and pride in their tribe.
What Activities do members of your tribe participate in together?
Does the tribe playa role in conflict in the community?
Are political choices effected by tribal affiliation?
Do you follow the tribes lead?
Are Amazight political parties important?
Do you make political choices based in being Arab or Amazight?
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Appendix IV:

Annotated Bibliography

Barth, Fredrik ed.
1969 Ethnic Groups and Boundaries. Boston: Little, Brown, and Company.
A significant work in the field of ethnicity theory. As it stresses selfidentification as a mode of formulating ethnic identity, it was useful in this
study where ethnic identity was a key concept. The creation and maintenance
of ethnic boundaries is also key in this work.

"Berbers." Encyclopedia of Islam. 2nd edition, vol. 1. pp. 1173-1187
An entry that illustrates the common views of the Amazight and their
languages.

Briggs, Lloyd Cabot
1960 Tribes of the Sahara. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
An exhaustive ethno-historicallethnographic description of the tribal peoples

living in the Sahara. It is relevant to t his study for its discussion of
segmentary lineage and other formalized structures of the peoples it describes.
It is very much in the tradition of presenting itself as the ultimate source of

truth, but contains little analysis.
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Combs-Schilling, M. E.
1989 Sacred Performances: Islam, Sexuality, and Sacrifice. New York:
Columbia University Press, 1989.
In this work Combs-Schilling argues that rituals of Islam as they are practiced
in Morocco were used in the 1500's to "reformulate t he foundations of their
central political institution" (xii). These rituals now reinforce and lend
authority to the monarchy. For my purposes, this argument is significant in
that its breadth leads Combs-Schilling to conclude that these rituals unite all
Moroccans under the power of the king. Her discussion of the "Berber Dahir'
interprets its significance under these terms. While I agree that the French
instituted this program to prevent national cohesion, she does not see the
Amazight as having a separate cultural identity to preserve. Thus, the dahir
served to unify the Moroccans as a unit, and then Morocco with the Arab
world. I contend that the Amazight do see themselves as a distinct cultural
group marginalized by the Arabs. I also agree that the rituals do have a
political component, which is why they are rejected by some of the militant
Amazights. Additionally, when I was in Morocco, the king ordered that only
he would perform the "Great Sacrifice", yet many chose to ignore this directive
or find ways to follow the letter, if not the spirit. Combs-Schilling does not
relate similar observations. To discuss her ritual analysis is out of the realm
of this study, but it is interesting and insightful nevertheless.
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Cohen, Abner
1974 Two-Dimensional Man: An Essay on the Anthropology of Power and
Symbolism in Complex Society. Berkeley and Los Angeles, University
of California Press, 1974.
Key to analyzing the symbolic and political lives of individuals and collectives,
this work also uses a system of analysis that is broad and multi-layered. It
provides means at looking at the many different components of a society, both
as individual factors and as a system.

1979 "Political Symbolism" in Annual Review of Anthropology. Palo Alto:
Annual Reviews, Inc.
This article builds in by giving specific theoretical and ethnographic accounts
of political symbolism in a society.

1981

The Politics of Elite Culture. Berkeley: University of California Press.

This ethnographic study of the Creoles in Sierra Leon is a direct application of
the theories expounded in Two-Dimensional Man etc. In this book, Cohen
looks at a specific group, their religious, economic, social, and cultural lives in
an effort to understand their elite position in the ethnic hierarchy of Sierra
Leon.
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Coon, Carleton Steven
1931 Tribes of the Rif. Harvard African Studies, vol. IX. Cambridge:
Harvard University Press.
Similar in style and content to Briggs' work, but dealing with a different area.
Coon was one of the earliest anthropologists working in Morocco, and an
influential ethnicity theorist of his time. His legacy looms large over Moroccan
anthropology, but many of his arguments are limited in range of analysis.
However, his work is a gold mine of information.

Crapanzano, Vincent
1980 Tuhami: Portrait of a Moroccan. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Tuhami is a man that Moroccans would consider to be abnormal, even
majnoon (crazy). Crapanzano tries to use him to illuminate the forces of social
norms and culturally held metaphors that negotiate a Moroccan's interactions
with each other, outsiders, and their reality. This work has helped me to
understand the sources of identity for an individual Moroccan, or perhaps even
Moroccans in that it illustrates the power of "little tradition" Islam. These
religious structures are mostly associated with the Amazight. The work also
deals with the ramifications of the colonial period in economic and personal
terms. However, this book is more interesting as an exercise in ethnographic
writing and then critical reading. It was ultimately frustrating as I did not
feel that I understood Tuhami, Aisha Qandisha, Moroccan Islam, Morocco, or
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even Crapanzano very well. However, this psycho-analytical approach of an
individual non-representative Moroccan was an interesting concept. (I think
Shostak's Nisa more successfully carried out a variation of this approach.)

Davis, Susan Schaefer
1983

Patience and Power: Women's Lives in a Moroccan Village. Rochester:
Schenkman.

Looking at the lives of women in this semi-rural town, Davis quickly learns
that women do not occupy the position of inferiority and powerlessness implied
by their stated cultural norms. Instead, they have informal power, mostly by
virtue of their position within a family. Females actually have access to more
channels of informal communication and power than men.

Davis, Susan Schaefer and Douglas A. Davis
1989 Adolescence in a Moroccan Town: Making Social Sense. New
Brunswick, Rutgers University Press.

In this work, Davis and her husband return to the same town that provided
the data for Patience and Power. As part of the Harvard Adolescence Project,
they examined this critical life stage. It is particularly concerned with effects
of the media, Western culture, urbanization, and psychological development.
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1995 "Possessed by Love: Gender and Romance in Morocco" in Romantic
Passion: A Universal Experience? William Jankoviak, ed. New York:
Columbia University Press.
In this article, using the same data as above, the Davis and Davis explore
romantic relationships and marriage in closer detail. They are most concerned
with a purported change in gender relations. They find a continuity of forms,
but a change in priority as a result of new economic and social concerns.

Entelis, John P.
1989 Culture and Counterculture in Moroccan Politics. Boulder: Westview
Press.
Entelis is a political scientist looking to culture for political explanations. He
does not see the Amazight peoples as a significant cultural or political force, to
which I (of course) have objections. He does provide me with important
information on Morocco's international policy and status in the realm, as well
as structure of Morocco's government. He does make a strong argument for
the influence of tribal heritage, Islam, and the monarch as fundamental
influence in Moroccan politics, but denies that Amazightism is a factor. This
work as well as Combs-Schilling's and others indicate that this feeling of pride
and importance of the Amazight identity is a relatively new element in
Moroccan politics.
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Gellner, Ernest
1969 Saints of the Atlas. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Most notable for its treatment of segmentary lineage, this is an intricate
ethnography of the Central High Atlas mountains. It most concerned with
social organization strategies.

Gellner, Ernest and Charles Micaud, eds.
1972 Arabs and Berbers: From Tribe to Nation in North Africa. Lexington:
Lexington Books.
This somewhat dated work contains numerous articles dealing with the
formation of the Post Colonial Morocco foreshadows many of the trends
elaborated in this study. For example, Octave Marais in his article "The
Political Evolution of Berbers in Independent Morocco" predicts a discontent
with the monarchy among the Amazight and a movement to greater
contribution in their own government.

Hammoudi, Abdellah
1993 The Victim and Its Masks: An Essay on Sacrifice and Masguerade in
the Maghreb. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
A fascinating account of the tradition of masquerade in the rituals of rural
Amazight, Hammoudi manages to integrate a functionalist argument with folk
psychology and an analysis of the power structure at work. The ritual of
liminality he describes exists on many different levels, and he lets us into all of
them.
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Hoffman, Bernard G.
1967 The Structure of Traditional Moroccan Rural Society. Hauge-Paris:
Moutron & Co.
A fairly mediocre account of the political and informal power structures that
focuses on economic issues and fluctuations individual powers.

Joffe, E.G.H. and C.R. Pennell eds.
1991 Tribe and State: Essays in Honour of David Montgomery Hunt.
Outwell, Cambridgeshire: Middle East and North African Studies Press.
This volume contains articles by almost every major figure in the
contemporary study of Morocco. Many of these essays focus on the influence of
zawiya, religious brotherhoods of the Sufi tradition. They cover
anthropological, historical, and political topics. The articles I found to be the
most relevant were
"Bargaining for Segmentarity" by John Waterbury
He argues that segmentarity now exists only as idiom in the political
consciousness of Moroccans. This does mean that it is nor influential, but that
is only a model.
"The Segmentary Lineage Mode; in the Jbalan Highlands of Morocco" by
Henry Munson, Jr.
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He argues that segmentary lineage did not exist before colonialism but rather
had a more formalized political institution.
"Tribalism and Moroccan Resistance 1890-1914, the Role of the Ait Ndhir" by
Edmund Burke, III
He sees a dominant urban perspective that has skewed understanding of
Moroccan history and goes on to argue that the Ait N dhir were a highly
influential power in Morocco. It is this "dominant urban perspective" that is of
interest (120).

1996 Lakhsassi, Abderrahman. "Amazighism (The Berber Identity)." Center
for Cross-Cultural Learning, Rabat, Morocco. 22 Mar. 1996.
Lakhsassi is an Amazight, but in the reductionist camp that sees Amazighism
solely in linguistic terms. I had prolonged debate with him that gave me
interest in this topic.

Lincoln, Bruce
1989 Discourse and the Construction of Society: Comparative Studies of
Myth. Ritual, and Classification. New York: Oxford University Press.
This volume presents several specific analysis of ritual. It fits them into a
generalized model of social forms. This theory states that myth, ritual, and
ideology are a function of social organization, but are exertive entities capable
of change. His analysis of the Swazi Ncwala is excellent, clearly showing the
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relationship between a ritual of disorder and the maintenance of societal
order.
McCready, William
1983 Culture, Ethnicity, and Identity: Current Issues in Research. New
York: Academic Press.
A compendium of articles on ethnicity coming from a wide variety of
backgrounds, this volume excels as highlighting the complex nature of this
topic. Abdo 1. Baaklini's "Ethnicity and Politics in Contemporary Lebanon" is
particularly useful in this study. It provides models for understanding ethnic
conflict, and what sustains or ends it.

1984 Miller, James A. Imlil: A Moroccan Mountain Community in Change.
Boulder: Westview Replica.
The three part identity, environment, tribe, and Islam, described in this book
makes a nice system. Miller is geographer, and stresses environmental
determinism over all other factors. In addition, he accepts stated norms,
~specially

in the case of Islamic doctrine, perhaps a little too easily. Overall,

this is a nice account of one village, but not particularly of the mechanism
behind it, especially those of change.

Munson, Henry Jr.
1984 The House of Si Abu Allah: The Oral History of a Moroccan Family.
New Haven: Yale University Press.
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A dense account of a single family, Munson does well to explain the
relationships between the members of the family and between the family and
society. He is concerned with relating the symbols and organization of Islam,
the Moroccan state, the family, etc. with individual lives.

1994

Religion and Power in Morocco. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Munson is primarily motivated by deprecating Clifford Geertz's analysis of
many of the same issues. However, Munson is looking almost entirely at
"High Islam" at not at the "Little Tradition" concerns of Geertz. Munson also
gives an interesting account of the rising fundamentalist movement in
Morocco that suffers from lack of sufficient comparative data.

Nelson, Harold D.
1985 Morocco: A Country Study. 5th edition. Washington DC: American
University.
A good source for the conventional analysis of Morocco as well as statistics and
other information.

The Organization and Evolution of Modern Morocco. Casablanca: Dar EI
Kitab for the Ministry of Information.
A government issued publication that describes the structure of Moroccan
government in very nationalist, propoganda-ish terms. This is of interest
because it uses imagery of Amazight tradition to color it descriptions.

89

Oussaid, Brick
1981 Mountains Forgotten by God: The Story of a Moroccan Berber Family.
Trans. Ann Wollcombe. Washington, DC: Three Continents Press.

An insightful mostly biographical account of an Amazight family living in
rural Morocco during the struggle for independence. Significantly,Oussaid
often uses his tribe as a measure of his personal and political identity.

Seddon, David
1981 Moroccan Peasants: A Century of Change in the Eastern Rif 1879-1970.
Folkstone: William Dawson & Sons.
An analysis mostly concerned with the economic changes of the Eastern Rif,
this volume provides relevant information about social organization, especially
the formal structures of tribal government.

Thompson, Richard H.
1989 Theories of Ethnicity: A Critical Appraisal. Contributions on Sociology,
no. 82. New York: Greenwood Press.
I read this book so that I could have a better understanding of ethnicity theory
as that lies beneath everything that I am trying to accomplish in this study.
Thompson systematically describes and criticizes many of the predominant
theories of ethnicity (sociobiology, primordialist, primordialist in a Geertz-ian
way, assimilationism and is detractors, world system, and neo-Marxist).

90

Thompson also declares that a scholar must make a "theoretical choice" as to
which he or she will follow, with Thompson choosing a neo-Marxist theory
with the economic component reduced. I found all his arguments to be logical
and persuasive, and I see why he made his choice. However, I was not
convinced that Thompson resolved his own problem with Marxist analysis-that it is reductionist, essentialist, and focused on economic issues. While I
would take some parts of this, the Geertz model of primordialism appeals to
me. We have racial and ethnic categories because we as people see and
attempt to describe variation in a way that coincides with our world views.
Thompson's argument neglects Barth who systematizes some ideas about
fluctuations in ethnic groups and their importance.

Waterbury, John.
1970 Commander of the Faithful: The Moroccan Political Elite. New York:
Columbia University Press.
A very useful volume for comprehending the royal and elite

circl~s.

Banned in

Morocco, it is not exactly complimentary to this system. The analysis is broad
and cohesive, within the stated mission of describing the political elite.
Therefore, its scope and applications are limited.

